The Spanish savings banks and the competitive cooperation model (1928-2002) by Comín, Francisco
UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID
Working Papers in Economic History
UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID c/ Madrid 126 28903 Getafe (Spain)Tel: (34) 91 624 96 37
Site: http://www.uc3m.es/uc3m/dpto/HISEC/working_papers/working_papers_general.html
DEPARTAMENTO DE
HISTORIA ECONÓMICA
E INSTITUCIONES
April 2007 WP 07-09
The Spanish savings banks and the competitive
cooperation model (1928-2002)
Francisco Comín
Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between the nature of Spanish Savings
banks and the extent of their market success during the twentieth century. It
deals with the key factors that have made so good a performance possible,
such as: their ability to promote private saving, to cooperate with government
economic policy, to adapt to changing circumstances, to operate in particular
geographical areas, and to cooperate with one another. Finally, the paper deals
with this last factor in depth. The competitive cooperation model is used to
explain the outstanding role of the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks in
making the strategic alliance among the Spanish savings banks possible.
Keywords: Savings banks, commercial banks, competitive cooperation,
economic policy, savings banks association, Spain, Europe
JEL Classification: G21, N24
Francisco Comín: Dpto. de Fundamentos de Economía e Historia Económica, Facultad de
Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Alcalá, Pza. de la Victoria 3, 28802 Alcalá
de Henares (Madrid) Spain
Email: francisco.comin@uah.es
1The Spanish savings banks and the competitive cooperation model (1928-2002).
Francisco Comín (Universidad de Alcalá, Spain)1
From the standpoint of banking history, the success story of savings banks in
Spain is virtually unique, not only in Europe, but in the world2. The fact is that the
savings banks are winning market share from the Spanish banks and are just as efficient
as the latter3 . The performance of Spanish savings banks is all the more remarkable in
that Spanish commercial banks are among the most efficient in the world, as witness
their international growth, not only in Latin America but also in the USA and the EU.
This article attempts to explain the role of cooperation among the savings banks
in Spain and the outstanding influence of the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks
(Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros –CECA) on the expansion of the market
share of savings banks in Spain as from the foundation of the CECA in 1928. The
article has three sections. The first section describes the historical performance of the
savings banks, examining the market share records for deposits and borrowed capital
1 This Working Paper is an advance on the main conclusions of a book I am currently
writing to be published in 2008 with the title Historia de la cooperación entre las Cajas
de Ahorros. La Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, 1928-2003 [History of
cooperation among Savings Banks. The Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks,
1928-2003].
2 Only the Norwegian savings banks have as successful a record as the Spanish. See
Pampillón (1994), Pampillón (2003), pp. 62-78.
3 See Pérez (2003), pp. 60-198, Pérez and Doménech (1990), Cals Güell (2005).
2since 1850. The second section looks at the characteristics of the savings banks that
have made their good performance possible, focusing on their ability to foster private
saving, to cooperate with government economic policy, to adapt to changing political,
economic and financial circumstances, to specialise in certain geographical areas and to
cooperate with other savings banks. This last aspect is analysed in more depth in the
third section since it is a fundamental factor in the success of the savings banks, which
channelled their cooperation through the CECA4 .
I
The market share of the savings banks.
To assess the progress of the savings banks in the Spanish financial system, we
need to look at the historical series of their share of the markets in deposits and
borrowed capital. The benchmarks referred to by the savings banks in their growth
strategy were always the private banks (which possessed the largest market share) and
to a lesser extent credit cooperatives. Especially from the 1960s on, ordinary meetings
of the Board of Directors of the Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros (CECA)
analysed the ‘statistical data’ reflecting the evolution of deposits, borrowed capital,
loans and securities portfolios for the savings banks as a group and for their banking
competitors. The managers of the savings banks (who were members of the Board of
Directors of the CECA) attached more importance to out-performing the banks than to
4 For the history of the CECA, see Forniés (1978), pp. 163-177, Comín (2004), pp.
339-57, Comín (2005), pp. 27-47, Comín (2006), Comín (2007), Comín and Torres
(2003), pp. 246-84, Comín and Torres (2005), pp. 48-64, Torres (2005), pp. 16-25.
3whether the statistics were performing well or badly5. Market share was therefore their
chief strategic indicator, against which the success or failure of savings banks was
measured. Figure 1
{please place Figure 1 near here}.
Figure 1 shows the market share of the savings banks as assessed on two bases:
data from before the Spanish civil war (which commenced in 1936) showing the
savings banks’ deposits as a percentage of all deposits in the banking system6; the post-
civil war series shows the savings banks’ borrowed capital as a percentage of the total
for the banking system7. The evolution of both series was very similar until the 1960s,
when the savings banks began to expand their current accounts. But both series show
some divergences (in the period for which data are available on both) for which there
are a number of explanations. The first is that the two series are based upon different
primary sources. Another is that the deposits series does not include among the savings
banks either the Caja Postal (State-owned) or other non-federated savings banks – in
5 The main sources for the strategies of the savings banks and the CECA have been the
collections: ‘Actas de las Sesiones de la Comisión Permanente’, in Libro(s) de Actas de
la Comisión Permanente de la Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, 1928-
2002, Madrid, Archive Secretaría General de la CECA [hereafter ASG], and ‘Actas de
las Asambleas Generales de la Confederación Española de Ahorros, 1928-2002, ASG.
6 The source is Martínez Soto and Cuevas, Estadísticas de las Cajas de Ahorros
españolas (1840-1935) (unpublished).
7 The source of this series is F. Hernangómez, Estadísticas de las Cajas de Ahorros y de
la Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros (unpublished).
4other words, it only takes into account savings banks which were members of the
CECA. Moreover, this series treats the Banco de España (which was the bank of issue
but was a private bank like the rest and the largest of them) as part of the banking
system, and therefore its deposits are included in the divider. Before 1935 it was logical
to include the Banco de España among the private banks since it was precisely that (it
was nationalised in 1962), albeit its deposits possessed particular weight in the banking
system overall. During the nineteenth century, the deposits of the Banco de España
generally accounted for more than half of the total; in the early twentieth century its
importance began to decline, but as late as 1917 the deposits held by the Banco de
España still accounted for 32 per cent; by 1921, when Cambó’s Banking Act was
promulgated, it was only 19 per cent, declining constantly thereafter until the years of
the Second Republic (1931-1936) when it was between 7 and 10 %. The decline in the
importance of the Banco de España up to 1922 was a consequence of growth of private
bank deposits; thereafter, however, the cause was an ostensible increase in savings bank
deposits following a downturn during the First World War. This evolution of the share
of the savings banks is depicted in the two series in graph 1. The evolution of the two
series is similar in the medium term, and the real figure for the savings banks’ market
share is probably somewhere between the two. The problem with the deposits market
share series is that no figures are available for after the civil war. Post-1918, I therefore
opted to analyse the series based on borrowed capital, which is homogeneous.
In this borrowed capital series we find strong growth of the market share of the
savings banks following a decline between 1918 and 1922. The gain in market share by
the savings banks post-1922 accounts for the concern evinced by the private banks at
savings bank expansion. The bank employers’ association (Consejo Superior Bancario)
sought to put a brake on competition from the savings banks by persuading the dictator
5Primo de Rivera to approve a Decree in 1926 which was designed to hamper the latter’s
operations. In 1928 the savings banks’ market share grew from 16.5 to 25.1 per cent;
that same year the Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros was set up as an
association for the purpose of lobbying on behalf of the sector and trying to counter the
pressure from the banks. In fact the CECA succeeded in having the 1926 decree
reformed and a Savings Statute more favourable to the savings banks approved in 1929.
The savings banks’ market share dropped in 1929, but from 1930 to 1933 it recovered,
rising to 26.7 per cent. That year saw the approval of a new Savings Statute, and also
the creation of the Instituto de Crédito de las Cajas de Ahorros [Savings Bank Credit
Institute], which was intended to serve as a coordinating body for the financial activity
of the savings banks8. At the end of 1935, the market share of the savings banks stood
at 26.9 per cent. The 1920s, then, were good years for the savings banks, as were the
early 1930s albeit to a lesser extent; in the space of ten years, their market share grew
by ten points. In fact before the start of the Civil War, the savings banks handled more
than a quarter of the market in deposits9.
As figure 1 shows, all the inter-war gains were lost after the Civil War and the
advent of the Franco dictatorship. Indeed, by 1942, the market share of the savings
banks had fallen to 16.7 per cent, the same level as they had attained in 192210. The
8 See Fernández Ramos (2006).
9 Based on the other series from Martínez Soto y Cuevas, ‘Estadísticas…’, the market
share of the savings banks would have been a fifth of the total.
10 Compared with the Martínez Soto y Cuevas series ‘Estadísticas...’, the decline in the
Hernangómez series (‘Estadísticas…’) is smaller. Be it remembered, however, that
these are two unlike series and that had the first continued after the civil war it would
have given even lower post-war percentages.
6savings banks did not begin to recover market share until 1946; from then until 1952 it
rose to 21.3 per cent, where it remained stable until 1956. Thereafter they saw renewed
growth, from 22.4 per cent in 1957 to 24.7 per cent in 1962. Note that at this point they
had not yet recovered their pre-Civil War level – in other words, the autarchy phase of
the Franco regime was a poor one for the savings banks. Between 1939 and 1957, it
was all the CECA could do to fend off the threats assailing the savings banks; indeed,
the Ministry of Labour (under whose supervision they operated as charitable
institutions) tried on several occasions to exert control over the savings banks’
investments and all their social works11 . The savings banks’ deposits did not regain
their pre-war level until 1966; in other words, they took thirty years to recover from the
economic disaster of the Civil War and post-war. Whatever the level of savings, the
savings banks clearly fared much worse than the private banks during the period of
autarchy.
The savings banks did not therefore break through their pre-war market share
ceiling until the 1960s. Their growth in those years was influenced by a number of
factors. The first was the economic policy of the new Franco government, which was
more intent on economic growth and hence saw it as essential to raise the rate of
saving. For that purpose Franco’s governments used the savings banks. And thus things
began to change for them in 1957 when they exchanged the oversight of the Ministry of
Labour for that of the Ministry of Finance. Thereafter, they were treated more as
financial institutions than as charitable organisations12. The Ministry of Finance was
11 ‘Acta de la Sesión de la Comisión Permanente [hereafter ASCP], 7/4/1960’, Libro de
Actas de la Comisión Permanente de la CECA [hereafter LACP], 6, 143-51, Madrid,
CECA, Archivo de la Secretaría General [hereafter ASG].
12 ASCP, 11/12/1957, LACP, 6, 99-103, ASG.
7interested in enhancing the power of the savings banks to attract savings, which it then
forced them to invest in the financing of whatever public and private enterprises the
government determined, through mandatory investment coefficients13. The second
factor in the development of the savings banks was economic growth in the 1960s; this
drove growth in the income of wage-earners and the middle classes with nation-wide
industrialisation and urbanisation, and these were natural customers for the savings
banks14. This development was good for the latter, which in 1971 achieved a market
share of 32.7 per cent, another milestone in their historical progress. A third factor
accounting for their growth was that the CECA began to provide them with certain
financial and other services that had hitherto been provided by the ICCA only less
efficiently15.
Between 1972 and 1981 the market share of the savings banks remained
practically stable at between 30 and 33 per cent. In other words, the economic and
banking crisis prevented the savings banks from advancing positions. However, they
did not lose either, at a time when international banks began to operate in Spain,
growing to absorb the ground lost by the bankruptcies of Spanish commercial banks in
the economic crisis. The savings banks weathered the crisis better than the private
banks, as witness the fact that no savings banks folded and there was hardly any call on
the Savings Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund to bail out savings banks, unlike the Bank
Deposit Guarantee Fund16.
13 ASCP, 29/1/1964, LACP, 7, 185-97, ASG; ASCP, 24/10/1964, LACP, 7, 227-39,
ASG.
14 ASCP, 4/2/1960, LACP, 6, 134-43; ASCP, 17/2/1972, 8, 159-75, ASG.
15 ASCP, 1/12/1971, 8, 149-59, ASG.
16 Quintás (2003), pp. 1-26.
8Subsequently, the savings banks achieved very strong growth between 1981 and
1988, when their market share reached 44.5 per cent. With the recovery from the
economic crisis and liberalisation of the financial system starting in 1977, the savings
banks were able to win market share from the commercial banks. One particularly
important government measure was Decree 2290 of 1977, which introduced
organisational changes in the savings banks (democratisation of their Corporate
Governance boards) and allowed them to undertake the same financial transactions as
the banks17 . In 1977 savings bank operation began to be assimilated to that of banks, so
that they were able to compete in the market on equal terms. Between 1988 and 1991,
on the other hand, the market share of the savings banks stagnated. There were a
number of reasons for this. The first was the application in 1985 of the Savings Bank
Governance Boards Act (Spanish acronym LORCA, Ley de Órganos Rectores de las
Cajas de Ahorros), whereby savings banks were forced to replace most of their senior
managerial staff. The second was the abolition of the territorial principle, which
intensified conflict amongst savings banks as they were allowed to compete in all
regions of Spain18. The third was that during those years competition among savings
banks sidelined cooperation; and in fact in that time there was some disarray in the
CECA (which underwent a severe crisis) and numerous disputes between savings
banks. This explains why it was not until 1992, once a new equilibrium had been
established among the savings banks and the Confederation organised to continue the
strategy of cooperation among savings banks in a new context, that their market share
saw significant new growth, reaching 50.2 per cent in 1994. Having arrived at this
17 ASCP, 19/10/1977, ASG.
18 ‘Acta de la Sesión Ordinaria del Consejo de Administración de la Confederación
Española de Cajas de Ahorros’ [hereafter ASOCA], 28/4/1986, ASG.
9position, the challenge was now to retain it. Nevertheless, after 1996 they continued to
expand, if at a slower rate, peaking at 53.6 per cent in the year 2001. In other words,
today the savings banks have a larger share of the Spanish banking market than the
private banks.
Over the long term, between 1965 and 2001 the savings banks doubled their
market share in terms of family and business deposits, certainly a historic achievement.
In fact this was one of the most important structural changes in the financial market in
the last third of the twentieth century. Also, the expansion of the savings banks
occurred largely in the wake of the advent of democracy and the Fuentes Quintana
(Vice-Premier for Economic Affairs) decrees of 1977 which liberalised the financial
system. What this means is that the savings banks also performed better in competitive
financial markets than when their activity was hampered by the financial constraints
imposed by the Franco regime. During that period of growth the savings banks lacked
any kind of legal advantage and received neither assistance nor subsidies from public
bodies. The explanation for this gain in market share lies in the fact that savings banks
enjoyed clear competitive advantages over Spanish and foreign commercial banks and
credit cooperatives.
II
Characteristics of the savings banks
The nature of the savings banks is at the root of some of the characteristics of
their operation that have enabled them to compete with the private banks and lay the
foundations for their successful gain of market share in the last few decades. These
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characteristics are: 1) their capacity to encourage and attract popular saving, – i.e., of
manual workers, white-collar workers and the middle classes; 2) their cooperation –
more or less forced – with governments to channel these funds towards certain
economic and social objectives, which undoubtedly encumbered them to some extent
but also brought a number of undeniable advantages; 3) their flexibility in adapting to
changing political, economic and financial circumstances; 4) their strong territorial
roots in the various parts of the country; 5) their contribution to economic growth and
social well-being, which strengthened the esteem and loyalty of their customers; and 6)
cooperation and solidarity among the savings banks, which enabled them to achieve
economies of scale (political, technical, financial and mercantile) without the need of
merging to attain greater size.
To start with, the capacity of the savings banks to encourage and attract popular
savings was achieved thanks to a business strategy which successfully gained acceptance
among the middle and working classes. The growth of the strong roots laid down in this
segment of the financial market was made possible by the creation of new financial
instruments to attract small savers (interest-bearing deposits and deposit pass-books), by
novel commercial strategies (advertising campaigns promoting savings, and incentives
such as prizes, lotteries and free gifts), and by their orientation towards charity and social
spending as a way of distributing net profits after allocations to reserves. Indeed, the
savings banks carried out an essential function in fostering and attracting savings, in a
specialised manner, among the middle and lower classes by means of strategies normally
associated with what came to be known as ‘retail banking’19. The savings banks certainly
19 In fact the savings banks developed techniques of their own to attract popular savings
– savings pass-books, draws and prizes – and a communication strategy that was readily
grasped by the sectors targeted by it. For an analysis of the nature and functions of the
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stimulated saving among the working and middle classes, drawing into the financial
circuits a considerable portion of the population, who subsequently remained loyal to
them. In the beginning this helped consolidate the social order inasmuch as savers viewed
their deposits as a property that they had to defend, and the savings banks thus came to
serve as counter-revolutionary institutions, as was intended when they were created in the
nineteenth century. In the twentieth century the savings banks continued to help instil a
culture of saving, through promotional messages and their methods of paying interest on
deposits. In the mid-1960s the savings banks began to reach out to customers in the upper
middle classes by offering specific products (current accounts and cheque books) and
through publicity tailored to the segment20.
In the second place, the savings banks were receptive to government guidelines
and regulation from the outset, and they enjoyed some advantages in return. In the
nineteenth century they were viewed as charity institutions and their activity was regulated
by the government; in return they enjoyed certain fiscal advantages. In 1904 they began to
cooperate with the government in social policy. In 1957 the government began to view the
savings banks as financial institutions with the capacity to channel funding into public
investment projects. And in 1977 it began to view them as an instrument through which to
introduce competition in financial markets. To enable them to accomplish these financial
tasks, in 1957 the government began allowing them to expand their operations to attract
liabilities and started approximating their status to that of the banks – including as regards
taxation, so that the savings banks gradually lost their fiscal privileges. As for asset
operations, the investments made by the savings banks were regulated by the State. From
the time of the Decree of 1835 until 1880, Spanish governments obliged the savings banks
savings banks, see Revell (1989).
20 See Comín and Torres (2003).
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to invest their funds in the financing of the public pawnbroking establishments known as
Montes de Piedad. Thereafter, they were allowed more freedom to invest, until 1933 when
the Savings Statute compelled them to invest a percentage of their deposits in public debt.
During the Franco years the savings banks were obliged to invest most of their borrowed
capital in public debt issues and bonds of private companies, and to grant loans to certain
sectors. Only after 1977 was investment by savings banks liberalised, and hence until the
1980s the savings banks’ asset operations were regulated, more or less strictly, by
government-imposed financial repression. This caused the savings banks to exercise
special prudence in their investments and constituted a guarantee for depositors; and the
consequent solvency of the savings banks undoubtedly attracted more customers. They
were able to indulge this aversion to risk over the long term because of their status first as
beneficent institutions and later as private non-profit foundations, and thus they were
sheltered from the temptation of risky speculative investments which wiped out some
private banks in times of financial crisis.
To all of this we must add the consistent honesty of patrons, management and
personnel, whose stability was essential to the efficient running of the savings banks. On
the other hand their subjection to State – and post-1977 regional – regulation constituted a
brake on their financial activity until compulsory investment coefficients disappeared in
the 1990s. The way in which the political significance of the savings banks varied
according to the historical circumstances is clearly illustrated by the list of Ministries –
Interior, Labour and finally Finance – by which they were regulated and supervised
over the years. They started up as entities created to contribute to public charity as a
means of maintaining law and order, and as such they were controlled by the Ministry
of Interior in the nineteenth century. Next they became instruments of new government
social policies, and therefore were placed under the tutelage of the Ministry of Labour
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in the 1920s. And finally they came to be viewed as standard financial organisations
whose chief function was to act as intermediaries between savers and the public bodies
to which they were compelled to entrust part of their investments, rising from 30 to 60
per cent of borrowed capital in 1951 and then to 80 per cent after 1964. This is the
reason why they eventually came under the wing of the Ministry of Finance.
In the third place, the savings banks have shown a striking ability to adapt in
response to the difficulties posed by changing economic circumstances, and above all by
swings in government policy as regards regulation of them. Spanish governments
historically made the savings banks live in a perpetual state of insecurity, and that honed
their capacity to survive. The flexibility with which the savings banks have been able to
adapt to shifts in the environment is reflected in their remarkable evolution. They began
life as financial adjuncts of the old Montes de Piedad, designed to attract savings with
which to finance the secured loans that these gave to the poorer classes in the nineteenth
century. When in the late nineteenth century the deposits attracted by the savings banks
began to exceed the capacity of the Montes de Piedad to absorb them, they were forced to
start seeking alternative investments and began to specialise in security-guaranteed
collateral loans, mortgage loans and acquisition of securities. Then, when the Welfare
State began to take shape in the early twentieth century, the savings banks helped to
finance social welfare activities, chiefly social insurance and cheap housing. Later on,
during the autarchy period of the Franco regime, the savings banks were used to finance a
State with a shoestring budget due to the absence of any modern tax reform; the savings
banks were also used to finance a number of autonomous boards and public enterprises
which received special funding, promised by the State but provided willy-nilly by the
savings banks. Also, under Franco the social works of the savings banks were entirely
controlled by the Ministry of Labour to finance the government’s social policy. Growth in
14
the sixties enabled the savings banks to expand their operations thanks to growing
deposits, and to diversify them through the new missions assigned them in the
Development Plans set in motion starting in 1964. And finally, with the advent of
democracy and the consolidation of the Welfare State, which was at last able to finance
public investment and social and redistributive spending thanks to the reform of 1978, the
savings banks were able to acquire the status of financial institutions, operating on equal
terms with the banks – albeit while still retaining their charitable and social goals. Then
they were used to inject competition into the banking system, and it was thanks to that
service that they achieved operational equality with the banks. Moreover, with political
freedom the savings banks achieved sufficient efficiency to make rapid gains in market
share. It was in situations of political freedom, which returned to Spain after the death of
Franco, and competition in the financial market, introduced in 1977, that they historically
performed best, as we have seen. However, their ability to compete was no improvised
matter but something built up in the past. In fact the savings banks achieved a notable
degree of financial solvency and managerial capacity while they were compelled to
operate within very severe constraints, in the difficult years when they played second
fiddle to the banks.
In the fourth place, the territorial aspect has been fundamental in that the savings
banks have always been identified with their towns and provinces of origin. Thanks to
their geographical specialisation they have traditionally had a better knowledge of local
markets and the peculiarities of savers in a particular region. Moreover, being closer to
their creditors has enabled them to reduce the risks attaching to lending. With their
investments the savings banks have helped to lend cohesion to certain communities or
regions and to stimulate economic growth there. This territorial function has been a
constant regardless of whether the founders were private individuals or – most commonly
15
– municipal or provincial bodies. In the savings banks sector the territorial principle
applied until 198521 . This meant that savings banks could not open branches outside their
own areas of operation. During the Franco years, plans for expansion and for the opening
of new branches required government approval and were confined to their own areas of
operation. With the passage of time, however, the savings banks expanded their areas of
operation through mergers and takeovers. As from 1985, they were allowed to open
branches in certain provincial capitals outside their own areas. And finally in 1989 they
were given freedom to expand anywhere within the national territory. As a result, they
were able to extend their operations to other regions, but even today the two largest
savings banks, which operate throughout the country, still tend to specialise in their
traditional areas.
In the fifth place, the savings banks have mobilised large volumes of funds and
have expanded Spain’s financial markets. In that sense they have been instrumental in
stimulating the country’s economic growth and social well-being. As we have seen,
application of the savings banks’ resources made it possible to finance the consumer needs
of the poorer classes in the nineteenth century; it enabled them to contribute to the funding
of social welfare and government spending between the beginning of the twentieth century
and the 1970s, through acquisition of public debt and compulsory investment coefficients;
and later on the savings banks’ credit operations enabled people to acquire consumer
durables and housing, made resources available to small and medium enterprises and
helped towns to expand their fixed and cultural assets. All this helped improve the image
of the savings banks among customers and has been one of the keys to their success.
In the sixth place, the most important factor in the success of the savings banks
has been cooperation among them. Since the CECA was founded in 1928, through
21 ASOCA, 18/3/1985, ASG.
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cooperation they have managed to lobby effectively to influence government
legislation. Moreover, since the creation of the ICCA in 1933, cooperation has enabled
the savings banks to achieve economies of scale and to network for commercial,
financial, advertising and technological purposes. Such collaboration was not easy to
achieve, and indeed it was attained despite the heterogeneousness of the savings banks
in terms both of size and balance-sheet structure and of competitive strategies,
especially following the onset of liberalisation with the advent of democracy22. The
origins of the CECA can be traced back to 1904, but it did not come into being until
1928. The creation of the National Banking Council (Consejo Superior Bancario –
CSB) was one of the factors that triggered cooperation among the savings banks. The
CSB was an official association of banks, created by Finance Minister Cambó by virtue
of the Banks Organisation Act of 1921 (Ley de Ordenación Bancaria). This Act was
intended to turn the Banco de España into a genuine central bank, but it stopped short,
failing to set up the necessary tools with which to implement a modern monetary policy
independently of the Ministry of Finance; it did not define open market transactions and
it lacked the autonomy to set interest and exchange rates. The banking crisis of the
22 The creation of an association of savings banks came later in Spain than in other
European countries, where savings bank associations began to spread in the late
nineteenth century; national associations (or federations) of savings banks came into
being in the following years: Germany in 1884, Great Britain in 1887, Sweden in 1900,
Austria in 1905, Denmark in 1905, Finland in 1906, the Netherlands in 1907, France in
1911, Italy in 1911 and Norway in 1914. See Wysocki (1996), pp. 9-25. For the history
of savings banks in the European countries, see L. Américi (2002), pp. 5–19, Bonin
(2005), pp. 93-108, Hertner (1996), pp. 193-227, Mura (1996), pp. 105-31, Ross
(2002), pp. 21–39, Ross (2005), pp. 82-91, Ó Gráda (2001).
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1920s showed that the Banco de España also did not act as a lender of last resort,
allowing several floundering banks to go to the wall. It did come to the aid of the Banco
Central in 1924, but that was because the dictator Primo de Rivera forced it to, the
board of directors of the Banco de España having earlier decided the opposite23. The
Banks Act of 1921 was successful in legally compartmentalising the financial system,
establishing a strict division between banks and savings banks that lasted until 1977.
However, it placed the banks at a distinct advantage, allowing them to carry on running
sections known as ‘cajas de ahorros’. Moreover, the Act discriminated against the
financial activity of the savings banks, another factor that stimulated the tendency of
the latter to associate. The Cambó Act legalised the cartel of the banks, organising it
officially as a new, quasi-public body called the Consejo Superior Bancario (CSB).
Like any organised cartel, the CSB sought to corner the market for members of the
oligopoly, leading rapidly to the establishment of an aggressive corporate strategy
against the savings banks; these were proving highly competitive, particularly in the
wake of the bank crashes of the 1920s, which handed the banks’ customers to the
savings banks on a plate. The response of the latter was naturally to imitate the banks
and organise corporatively. But in this sector of savings, the movement for association
did not at the outset enjoy official support; it was a spontaneous – and a defensive –
movement, initially centred on regional federations, which subsequently confederated.
The movement for association of the Spanish savings banks was supported by the
International Savings Bank Institute founded at the First International Savings Congress
23 According to Martín Aceña (1984). For the history of Spanish commercial banks, see
Comín and Martín Aceña (1996), pp. 75-123, Pérez (1997), Pons (2001), pp. 679-703,
Pons (2002), Martín Aceña and Pons (2005), pp.645-75.
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at Milan in 1924, which was attended by several Spanish savings banks24 . Ultimately,
however, the fundamental event giving rise to the creation of the CECA was the Royal
Decree-Law of the Military Directorate (1926). Inspired by the CSB, it forbade savings
banks to undertake certain transactions, from the opening of current accounts to
transfers of funds. To try and prevent this decree from taking force, the savings banks
created the CECA. Thus, with the creation of the Confederación Española de Cajas de
Ahorros in 1928, the banking market acquired the form of a competitive ‘duopoly’ of
associations in which the struggle between the two cartels was extremely bitter until
very recently. This antagonism passed through various phases, and the savings banks
progressed from a very difficult initial situation to one in which they progressively
gained ground until they won equal status with the private banks in 1977. In other
words, the CECA took half a century to win back the operational equality that the
savings banks had lost in 1926. The CECA played an essential role, first of all in
recovering lost ground and the business that the banks had initially tried to wrest from
the savings banks, then later in expanding the range of their activities as financial
institutions. At the outset the CECA concerned itself mainly with lobbying to defend
the savings banks’ traditional sphere of activity against the aggressive inroads of the
banks in popular savings, and with the efforts of the CSB to prevent the savings banks
from engaging in a number of commercial activities without which no banking business
24 There were representatives from the Caja Postal and the Cajas de Ahorros of Madrid,
Barcelona, Zaragoza and the Province of Guipúzcoa. For a world overview of savings
banks in the 1930s, see Instituto Internacional del Ahorro, ‘Las Cajas de Ahorro en el
mundo’, Etapa, 6 (1938), pp. 359-67.
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was properly balanced. Following the creation of the ICCA in 1933, the savings banks
began to cooperate in the financial sphere25.
From this author’s point of view, this last aspect of cooperation was essential to
the success of the savings banks, and it is therefore discussed in more detail in the
following section.
III
The competitive cooperation model
Conventional economic theory holds that economic resources may be allocated
either through market competition or through the internal hierarchy of the enterprise.
But economic history and more complex theoretical studies have demonstrated that
there are mixed forms of resource allocation combining market and firm. Examples
include quasi-integration of companies through long-term contracts and competitive
cooperation agreements between firms which formally retain their independent legal
status. Competitive cooperation among financial institutions is normally a response to
external changes in markets, produced mainly by major reforms of regulatory policy
and to technological innovations. In some circumstances it is possible to achieve greater
competitive capacity by means of competitive cooperation through renewable
agreements than by means of quasi-integration, which requires long-term agreements
between companies. Also, competitive cooperation is particularly efficient in contexts
where political factors make inter-company integrations difficult or impossible.
Moreover, competitive cooperation is an especially suitable organisational form for
situations where markets are in any way geographically compartmentalised; such
25 See Comín and Torres (2003).
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cooperation can sometimes be a good alternative to geographical expansion through
integration with other entities located in different geographical areas, and it is also less
costly and less risky than opening branches26.
Competitive cooperation is one of the more imaginative entrepreneurial
responses to be developed in the twentieth century; it expanded fastest in the second
half of the century, but even so it never came into very wide use. Competitive
cooperation consists in the sealing of strategic alliances among several institutions,
financial or otherwise, which agree to act in concert in certain activities in order to
attain the critical mass they need to compete in the market. The fundamental reason for
agreements of this kind is that such entities cannot attain that threshold of efficiency on
their own. These agreements are temporary and can embrace numerous different
aspects, from cooperation in research to joint contracting of services and simultaneous
marketing of jointly-developed products. Cooperation among companies makes it
possible to improve information resources, share business experiences, and also reduces
the risk element in certain kinds of investment, for instance in technologies
characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and rapid innovation. Among other
things, these inter-company agreements make it easy for partners to learn from one
another, thus facilitating the development of a capacity to adapt to changing
circumstances and contexts. Cooperation can help to get round legal and technical
restrictions on access to markets, and to challenge firms operating in markets that
would otherwise be unassailable. In markets with imperfect competition and monopoly
or oligopoly situations, competition can be neutralised by a number of factors: 1) the
existence of legal, technical or promotional barriers; 2) conditions favouring collusion
among companies and a reduction in their numbers through mergers; 3) the existence of
26 See Bátiz-Lazo (2004), pp. 23-56.
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high sunk costs, constituting high exit barriers deterring potential competitors from
entering the market. Competitive competition, then, can serve to break down some of
the barriers to both entry to and exit from a market. In the first case this is done by
cooperating to attain a size that will enable the partners to achieve efficiency in the
spheres of technology or promotion. In the second case it is done by strategic planning
to anticipate the competitive advantages, or share the risks, of investments in
technology. Of course cooperation can also be a means of securing advantages in
negotiations for changes in the law that will break down the legal barriers to
competition.
Like any other kind of market organisation or strategic business arrangement,
the practicality, and above all the success, of competitive cooperation requires that a
number of conditions be met. One fundamental prerequisite is that the partners have
clear objectives and shared expectations. In this way the benefits can be clearly set forth
and the costs of the agreements fairly distributed. The greater the similarity between the
partners, the simpler it will be to reach similar levels of commitment among them. This
is essential in that the degree of success of the cooperation will depend on the
commitment made by the parties involved. This explains why alliances for defensive
purposes are more likely to succeed than those envisaging offensive cooperation in the
face of competition. And again, cooperation is more likely to succeed if the
organisations concerned have had some kind of contact among them previously, or
better still some previous shared activity. Finally, the formation of cooperative alliances
can provide a bridge for the promotion of mergers entailing business integration27.
Although only briefly outlined here, this is the model that Bátiz-Lazo (2004)
uses to provide a convincing explanation for the success of the Spanish savings banks
27 See Bátiz-Lazo (2004).
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from 1994 on. However, the reality of competitive cooperation is far more complex
when viewed from the broader historical viewpoint. In fact the historical process which
culminated in the success of the savings banks was not an uninterrupted one but a
succession of steps forward and steps back. Also, the negotiations among them were
considerably more complex than all those highly attractive theories might lead one to
suppose. Cooperation among savings banks in fact began even before the creation of
the CECA, and these prior experiences indubitably contributed to the success of the
creation of the CECA in 1928 for the purpose of lobbying to break down the legal entry
barriers imposed by the State in 1926 at the instigation of the banks. Savings banks
began to collaborate financially with the creation of the ICCA in 1933, whose object
was to facilitate cooperation to achieve mobility of savings among different areas and
to enhance their capacity to negotiate in capital markets. And finally, cooperation in the
offer of services and in technological innovation came in the 1960s. At the same time it
is important to note that the model of cooperation adopted by the savings banks has not
always been successful in improving their market share, for instance during the period
of autarchy under the Franco dictatorship. Nonetheless, there is every reason to believe
that had the CECA not existed, the savings banks would have fared much worse during
those years.
In other words, the history of the Confederation should be seen not as progress
along a clear path leading inexorably to success for the savings banks, but rather as a
trail that had to be blazed, in which there were undeniable advances, but there were also
setbacks. This formula of cooperation with competition has opened the way to
questioning the generalised myth that size was the key factor in the success of the
banks. Given the possibility of cooperation, other factors like quality of management
and customer care have surely been more influential. It is true that retail banking offers
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significant economies of scale, which some savings banks have managed to achieve
through mergers. But since they encountered insurmountable political obstacles in the
legal impossibility of inter-regional mergers, the savings banks were forced to deal with
this barrier through ‘virtual mergers’ or competitive cooperation, which materialised
through the Confederation. Moreover, however big a savings banks may be, it can still
achieve greater economies of scale through competitive cooperation with smaller
savings banks; in this way the cost of some services can be reduced to less than that
achieved by even the largest banks28.
IV
Conclusions
In any event, despite these qualifications, all the characteristics noted as
conducive to the success of this competitive cooperation model have at some point
emerged in the history of savings bank cooperation.
One of the virtues historically displayed by the savings banks has been a
capacity to adapt to political and economic change, and that capacity may have been at
least partially the result of a readiness to share information and experience, particularly
during the twentieth century. In an ever-changing political and economic environment,
28 See Quintás (2003), ASOCA, 19/11/1997; ‘Acta de la sesión extraordinaria
monográfica del Consejo de Administración de la Confederación Española de Cajas de
Ahorros’, 23/5/1990, ASG; ‘Acta de la LXII Asamblea general de la Confederación
Española de Ahorros’, 12/12/1990, ASG; ASOCA, 20/2/2002; and ‘Acta de la
LXXXVI Asamblea general ordinaria de la Confederación Española de Cajas de
Ahorros’, 11/12/2002, ASG.
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evolution has been not an option but a must if the savings banks were to survive and
prosper. An outstanding factor in this capacity to adapt was also assuredly the CECA,
through its coordination and training functions and its representation of the savings
banks. The CECA was the first ‘savings bank’ to adapt to institutional changes,
reorganising in tune with the laws and decrees and the frequent policy shifts in the
country.
Throughout their history the savings banks have shared a number of
characteristics which have eventually served as a basis for cooperation. Since the 1920s
they have had certain obvious common objectives as regards defending themselves
against the discrimination introduced by the banking laws starting in 1921. However,
they were never a homogeneous group, and as such they never all had the same degree
of commitment to the CECA. Moreover, their objectives began to diverge as soon as
the barriers to competition with the private banks were removed in 1977, and even
more so with the introduction of freedom of geographical expansion in 1989. As a
result, cooperation has at times been difficult. Indeed, the CECA was forced to adopt
flexible policies in order as far as possible to satisfy the whole savings sector. Because
of the diversity of this sector, it was sometimes difficult to cater for the wide range of
interests determined by the differences in size, type of foundation and area of operation
of the savings banks. Nonetheless, the Confederation always sought to approximate and
address the interests of all its members by promoting solidarity among them. On
occasions this meant that all the savings banks had to give up some of their objectives,
but such solidarity made it possible to keep them together and improve the situation of
one and all. This union was the key to the strength with which they gradually achieved
institutional, legal and operational equality with the banks. And it was through
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competitive cooperation that the savings banks progressively wrested market share
from them.
The tendency in the CECA has always been to act defensively, and that has
contributed to the success of cooperation among the savings banks. They have never
adopted an aggressive policy towards external elements unless they have felt
threatened. The CECA – with the legal and judicial means at its disposal – defended
itself and the savings banks against pressure from the State and public bodies, from the
banks – private, public and foreign – and from credit cooperatives. But before taking
any action the savings banks have always tried to negotiate and reach an understanding
with those agents. They also negotiated with those companies which, taking advantage
of the investment obligations imposed on the savings banks starting in 1957, sought to
fix interest rates well below the market, to the detriment of the latter. The CECA also
strove to defend its members against the ambitions of politicians and public institutions
who sought to channel the savings banks’ investments and social works in directions
politically advantageous to themselves. The savings banks have always striven to
control their own investments and the way that their social works are applied, so that
these would directly benefit their customers and the areas in which they operate. The
CECA acted as intermediary between the savings banks and the government,
smoothing over whatever problems arose although always on the side of the former.
This last observation is of course a tautology, given that the CECA has always been
exactly what the savings banks wished it to be. The CECA has never imposed anything
on the savings banks, basically because it has never had the means to do so. Indeed,
when the savings banks began to place difficulties in the way of the Franco
government’s plans of controlling their investments starting in 1957, it became quite
clear that the CECA was unable and unwilling to impose any conditions on them. By
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1962 the government saw no other option but to award official status to the ICCA, with
powers of inspection and control over the savings banks. However, the ICCA
disappeared in 1971. Any time that an attempt has been made to impose something on a
savings banks through the CECA, it has been because the majority of the savings banks
represented in the association have so decided. Persuasion has always been the CECA’s
only weapon in dealing with the savings banks and the government. The function of
political and institutional intermediary performed by the CECA has been important in
that the savings banks have always constituted an ‘ownerless’ sector. The vagueness of
the rights of ownership in them has placed them in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the
public authorities ever since their foundation in the nineteenth century. Their
dependence on the various public authorities has changed with the passage of time, but
generally speaking the activity of the savings banks has always been regulated and
supervised by the central government through a succession of ministries. And finally
also, since the time of the transition to democracy the savings banks have become
subject to intervention by the Autonomous Communities.
The success of cooperation among the savings banks in Spain was underpinned
by the functionality that association in the CECA provided for the sector through the
services it supplied. Firstly, thanks to their unity and their organisation around the
CECA, they succeeded in augmenting their power to lobby the government. Secondly,
the association of savings banks made it possible to organise production in the savings
sector. This consisted on the one hand in defending the sector of activity operated by
the charity (or popular) savings banks against intrusion by bank savings operations and
cooperatives which did not offer customers the same deposit guarantees as the genuine
savings banks – the latter were after all under the authority of the Government, which
imposed on then a number of restrictions that gave depositors more security. On the
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other hand, until 1975, while the territorial principle remained operative, cooperation
among savings banks within the CECA was not competitive, inasmuch as they were
unable to open branches outside their own demarcations; the issue of competition
among savings banks or the sharing of regional markets was circumscribed to the
Regional Federations of Savings Banks each within its own purview; competition
among savings banks intensified starting in 1989, when they were finally allowed to
expand freely anywhere in the national territory. Thirdly, cooperation through the
CECA enabled the savings banks to achieve the economies of scale and networking
possible in some services29; the first common services were interchange, overseas
transactions and transfers, subsequently expanding to take in means of payment,
financial services and lastly technological services. Fourthly, the association of savings
banks acted as a ‘Bank of Savings Banks’ – i.e., as a lender of last resort to help savings
banks experiencing liquidity problems or structural difficulties. To perform that service,
in 1933 the savings banks created the Instituto de Crédito de las Cajas de Ahorros
(ICCA); its functions in this respect were taken over by the CECA in 1965, a situation
that was consolidated following the disappearance of the ICCA in 1971. Until 1965,
then, the representative bodies of the Spanish savings banks were structured on the
European model, characterised by having two kinds of association: an associative type,
or lobby (CECA), and a financial type (ICCA). But from that year on the Spanish
savings banks departed on a unique path of their own, merging the two types of activity
in a single association – the CECA.
Competitive cooperation among the Spanish savings banks has been defined as
a ‘virtual merger’ in the field of production of services30 . Through such cooperation
29 See Comín and Torres (2003).
30 By Quintás (2003).
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they have succeeded in securing the financial and technological advantages that go with
mergers. And yet they are still able to retain their independent legal personalities and
their regional idiosyncrasy. As such, this virtual merger allows them to compete with
one another using different commercial strategies. The virtual merger in the supply of
financial and technological services was intensified starting in 1994; since then, savings
banks have been able to freely take up the services offered by the CECA, and the latter
has introduced price differentials for savings banks depending on the volume of
business done. Recent years have also seen the culmination of the CECA’s strategy of
changing its area of specialisation, from ‘wholesale banking’ to ‘service providing’ for
the savings banks. During this last period the Spanish savings banks opted to intensify
their strategic cooperation, in response to the emergence of dynamic competitive
environments, beset by uncertainties and characterised by high demands in terms of
investment and exceptional expenses.
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Figure 1
Figure 1 Market share of the Savings Banks (per cent)
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Figure 1 Market share of the Savings Banks (per cent)
Deposits Borrowed capital
1850 19,0
1851 14,8
1852 13,0
1853 10,8
1854 11,8
1855 10,0
1856 9,8
1857 12,5
1858 11,3
1859 10,4
1860 12,7
1861 15,0
1862 13,6
1863 13,6
1864 22,2
1865 23,8
1866 19,0
1867 12,1
1868 15,2
1869 9,5
1870 7,2
1871 8,2
1872 10,9
1873 13,8
1874 11,4
1875 12,6
1876 15,2
1877 16,2
1878 15,5
1879 17,6
1880 13,1
1881 13,5
1882 18,1
1883 18,6
1884 17,2
1885 16,9
1886 16,6
1887 16,0
1888 13,4
1889 14,1
1890 15,4
1891 14,7
1892 17,1
1893 18,0
1894 21,5
1895 18,2
1896 17,9
1897 16,0
1898 10,0
1899 11,1
1900 10,9
1901 11,0
1902 12,1
1903 13,5
1904 13,8
1905 15,1
1906 15,4
1907 15,9
1908 16,8
1909 16,6
1910 17,0
1911 17,9
1912 18,9
1913 20,3
1914 19,9
1915 18,5
1916 17,8
1917 15,8
1918 13,1 19,1
1919 13,4 18,3
1920 12,9 17,3
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1921 14,2 18,7
1922 13,3 16,5
1923 14,0 17,6
1924 15,8 20,3
1925 16,7 22,9
1926 18,5 22,8
1927 17,3 22,8
1928 17,5 25,1
1929 16,7 21,3
1930 17,1 21,4
1931 19,6 26,0
1932 20,8 26,4
1933 21,3 26,8
1934 21,4 26,5
1935 20,0 26,9
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942 17,7
1943 18,4
1944 18,3
1945 18,6
1946 17,6
1947 18,6
1948 20,1
1949 20,4
1950 20,9
1951 21,0
1952 21,3
1953 21,6
1954 21,8
1955 21,6
1956 21,4
1957 22,4
1958 22,7
1959 23,4
1960 24,2
1961 24,3
1962 24,8
1963 25,7
1964 25,7
1965 26,6
1966 28,1
1967 29,6
1968 30,7
1969 31,4
1970 32,2
1971 32,7
1972 31,6
1973 30,5
1974 30,2
1975 31,1
1976 32,4
1977 33,0
1978 33,4
1979 33,2
1980 32,4
1981 32,8
1982 33,6
1983 34,4
1984 35,1
1985 38,9
1986 42,5
1987 42,9
1988 44,5
1989 44,7
1990 44,3
1991 44,8
1992 47,0
1993 48,5
1994 50,2
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1995 49,9
1996 51,7
1997 52,1
1998 52,8
1999 52,9
2000 53,1
2001 53,6
Sources: Martínez Soto and Cuevas, "Estadísticas…", Hernangómez, "Estadísticas…".
